rhetorical transactions such as the speaker, message design, and bilateral communication vectors. Th e normative pragmatic model proposed here off ers a more complete account by describing persuasive force in terms of strategies speakers use to design fear appeals. Put simply, fear appeals are designed to make manifest that the speaker has made a responsible assessment of potential fearful outcomes and how to address them and forestall criticism for poor judgment or fearmongering. Persuasive force is generated by message design features such as the claim that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as the speaker advocates, the presenting of grounds, and the use of intense language and is located in risks and commitments that these design features make manifest.
To support these claims, I briefl y overview how a normative pragmatic model describes rhetorical transactions. I then detail three leading models of fear appeals and point to characteristics of rhetorical transactions that they account for in a limited way or not at all. Finally I make a case for a normative pragmatic model of fear appeals. In the course of discussing other models as well as illustrating and supporting a case for the plausibility of a normative pragmatic one, I also analyze how speakers design fear appeals, turning to the 1787 debates in Virginia about whether to ratify the proposed United States Constitution. Since many of the issues the participants debate center on the topic of harmful consequences-the potential harms of ratifying the Constitution or not-fear appeals are at times rampant. Th e three-week span of the debates, the almost equal support for and against ratifi cation, and the high stakes contribute to the frequency and intensity of fear appeals and of comments about making fear appeals. Because the debates take place within a well-circumscribed amount of time and in a well-circumscribed location, it is possible to track both the fear appeals themselves and the commentary on them. Moreover, since the debates take place in a republican political institution and the subject matter concerns features of a republican political institution, they provide insight into appropriate places for fear appeals in republican forms of government.
A normative pragmatic model of communication takes into account all elements of a basic communication scenario: speaker, speech, audience, and context. It also takes into account bilateral communication vectors: speakerto-speech and speech-to-speaker on the one side and speech-to-audience and audience-to-speech on the other.
2 As a result, it describes context less in terms of external elements such as time limits than in terms of rhetorical elements such as presenting evidence. In other words, it describes the context generated just by saying something. As Jean Goodwin (2007, 85) has put it: "We do not assume that context comes already organized into social forms like 'dialogues' or 'critical discussions.' Instead, we take the talk through which, and within which, arguments are deployed as the primary means by which people organize a context for their interaction."
Saying something enables and constrains what both speaker and audience may say, which, in turn, changes the context. A normative pragmatic model explains why message design features may be expected to reasonably pressure addressees to act as the speaker advocates, which means it explains the persuasive force of message design features in a way that transcends wholly normative and wholly descriptive explanations (Manolescu 2005, 142; cf. Jacobs 2000, 264-65; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 6; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs 1993, 1-2; Walton 2000, 22) . In short, a normative pragmatic model is oriented toward describing public commitments made manifest by speaking.
In what follows I detail three leading models of fear appeals: the extended parallel process model (EPPM), a classical model, and a logical model. Th ese models omit characteristics of rhetorical transactions such as the speaker or message source, bilateral communication vectors, and characteristic message design features; and are oriented toward internal cognitions and states of mind. I illustrate explanatory problems by considering how each model addresses a signifi cant, serious charge against a fear appeal, namely, that it is manipulative. extended parallel process model Th e EPPM is a representative social scientifi c model of fear appeals that continues to be an important starting point for fear appeals research (Witte 1992 (Witte , 1994 Nabi, Roskos-Ewoldsen, and Carpentier 2008, 191, 192; Timmers and van der Wijst 2007, 22-23; Cho and Salmon 2006, 92) . Th e EPPM analyzes fear appeals based on the following message components: selfeffi cacy, response effi cacy, susceptibility, and severity. It models addressees' reasoning in response to the message components as follows. Addressees fi rst reason about the threat (susceptibility and severity) and then about the effi cacy of the recommended response and their ability to perform it (selfeffi cacy and response effi cacy). If perceived threat is low, then motivation to continue processing the message-and, specifi cally, to evaluate effi cacywill be low. If perceived threat is high and if perceived effi cacy is higher than perceived threat, then individuals are more likely to engage in danger control processes to protect themselves and to accept the message. But if perceived threat is high and if perceived effi cacy is low, then individuals are more likely to engage in fear control processes-attempts to control their own fear rather than respond to dangerous circumstances-and to reject the message, perhaps with the rationale that the message is manipulative (Witte 1994, 115-16; 1992, 337-45) .
Th is model is not designed to account for the degree to which a fear appeal meets normative criteria-to assess whether, for example, an addressee's perceptions of threat and effi cacy are reasonable. A normative pragmatic model of fear appeals, in contrast, explains message design features and the kinds of public responses by addressees that they enable and constrain. For example, the message design features speakers use to present claims about threat and effi cacy may warrant a charge by addressees that the speaker is attempting to manipulate them. Perhaps the addressee believes the language used is too intense or the evidence presented for the proximity of the threat is weak. Message design features such as these may better explain an addressee's charge of manipulation than the individual addressee's cognitions about his low perceived effi cacy in the face of high perceived threat.
Th e Virginia ratifying convention debates illustrate this point. In these debates delegates charge opponents with using fear appeals to manipulate. "Are we to be terrifi ed into a belief of its necessity?" they ask. Or they say, "It is a groundless objection, to work on gentlemen's apprehensions" (Elliot 1891, 285, 427; see also 54, 62, 638) . But this kind of remark is not best explained as an attempt by delegates to control the fear they feel in response to a fear appeal made by an opponent-as an outcome of delegates' perceptions of low perceived effi cacy in the face of high perceived threat. First, it seems as if perceived effi cacy by any individual delegate would have been high; since the vote was close-the results hinged on about six votes (Briceland 1988, 212-13; Einhorn 1990, 148-49) -an individual delegate could have reasonably asserted that his vote would determine the outcome of the debate. Second, delegates would have been vulnerable to criticism were they to have seemingly based their decision on feelings of fear instead of an assessment of grounds for fear. Th is vulnerability is made manifest in the delegates' call for reasoned deliberation. One notes, for example, that like religion, politics "is too often nourished by passion, at the expense of the understanding," and another asks, "Was it proper to appeal to the fears of this house? Th e question before us belongs to the judgment of this house" (Elliot 1891, 23, 42; see also 86-87, 177, 237) . Rather than viewing accusations of manipulation as signs of cognitions about perceived threat and perceived effi cacy, a normative pragmatic approach views such accusations as acts by an addressee that a designer of a fear appeal would want to forestall. A speaker who wants to design a fear appeal with persuasive force-that is, an appeal that exerts reasonable pressure on the addressees to act as the speaker advocates-needs to do so in a way that constrains addressees' ability to openly dismiss the appeal as manipulative.
Th is brief discussion points to interrelated features of rhetorical transactions not covered by the EPPM. First, the EPPM does not include a speaker or message source; it covers how message components aff ect addressees' cognitions. Second, the EPPM describes the message in relatively static terms-as comprising message components, and these, in turn, are described in terms of objects of addressees' cognitions, namely threat (susceptibility and severity) and effi cacy (self and response)-rather than as a dynamic transaction that features strategies such as presenting evidence. Th ird, the EPPM does not account for communication vectors other than message-to-addressee.
classical model
Two other leading models of fear appeals are designed to be normative. One may be described as classical since it is warranted by Aristotle's writings and illustrated by Demosthenes' practice. Michael Pfau posits this model to address the question of "what particular kinds of fear appeals are most and least civically responsible" (2007, 218) . He proposes "an Aristotelian approach in which the structure of the fear appeal is . . . designed to open up political debate and deliberations" (2007, 220) . Th e model is intended to defi ne an ideal; Demosthenes' rhetorical practice is "an almost textbook illustration" (2007, 225 ; see also 228) rather than a source of or grounds for the model. Aristotle's writings on rhetoric, politics, and ethics are the source (2007, 225) , so Aristotelian folk psychology grounds it.
Pfau argues that "more traditional 'dichotmous' fear appeals" (2007, 231) can be distinguished from civic fear appeals in two ways. First, civic fear appeals "tend to focus on objects of fear that are unrecognized or underappreciated," and so "fear appeals exploiting already much dreaded objects of fear are not appropriate objects of 'civic fear '" (2007, 231) . Pfau speculates "that rhetorical intensifi cation of already dreaded fears is almost always a sure sign of the very kinds of logical distortion and audience manipulation traditionally associated with fear appeals in political discourse" (2007, 231) . Signifi cantly, Pfau does not ascribe logical distortion and audience manipulation to intensifi cation; in this model there is nothing to suggest that using intense language cannot be reasonable. At issue is how to decide whether intensity is manipulative or reasonable. One measure suggested here is located in the minds of addressees: if they recognize or appreciate the object of fear-if they already dread it-then it is likely that the fear appeal is manipulative.
Th e second way civic fear appeals are diff erent from traditional "dichotmous" ones relates to the "character of the actions proposed in response to the object of fear" (2007, 231) . In contrast to a fear appeal designed "simply to gain compliance with the message source's recommended response," with a civic fear appeal "the rhetor seeks to encourage collective foresight by way of opening up political deliberations regarding the object of fear" (2007, . Th is measure is also internal, located in a speaker's ethical intent. Th is classical model, then, does not explain how speakers may design a fear appeal to avoid the charge of manipulation.
Instead it stipulates what knowledge internal to addressees or what intent internal to speakers makes it more likely that the fear appeal meets the normative standard of "opening up deliberation." Moreover, in this classical model "opening up deliberation" refers to inducing an internal state of mind; civic fear is "a deliberative emotion" (2007, 225) . Th e model does not account for how a fear appeal may be designed to pressure addressees to make manifest that they are deliberating-to in fact speak.
Th is stipulation of a speaker's intent excludes additional or alternative purposes for which speakers may design fear appeals at all. For example, this classical model defi nes away an ordinary understanding of why speakers make fear appeals: to gain compliance with a recommended response. In addition, consider reasons delegates give for making fear appeals in the Virginia ratifying convention debates. One delegate claims that he appeals to fear so that it will be "known that my opposition arose from a full persuasion and conviction of its being dangerous to the liberties of my country" (Elliot 1891, 643) . Other things being equal, making manifest a responsible assessment of the grounds for fear enables the delegate to avoid criticism on the grounds that, say, his vote is based on local interests or outside infl uence (e.g. Elliot 1891, 7, 177, 182, 237, 356, 364) . Delegates also make fear appeals to make manifest that they are fulfi lling their duties as representatives. Delegates say, for example, that they are representing the interests of some portion of the public: "I represent their feelings when I say that they are exceedingly uneasy at being brought from that state of full security, which they enjoyed, to the present delusive appearance of things" (Elliot 1891, 21 ; see also 63). Or they refer to a broader audience; one says that posterity "will see that I have done my utmost to preserve their liberty," and another points out that because he seeks "to hand down to posterity my opposition to this system," he sees it as his "duty to declare the principles on which I disapprove it, and the cause of my opposition" (Elliot 1891, 56, 637; see also 642, 652) . By making manifest a responsible assessment of the circumstances, they attempt to avoid criticism for shirking their duties; they make manifest an attempt to "discharge their duty with fi delity and zeal" (Elliot 1891, 14) . In fact, this helps to explain why delegates make fear appeals at all-why they do not simply cast a vote-when doing so may make them vulnerable to criticism for fearmongering or poor judgment. If they remain silent, they risk criticism for failing to warn about potential harmful consequences.
Th is discussion points to features of rhetorical transactions not covered by the classical model. First, it does not cover the range of purposes fear appeals can be put to, including the basic purpose of gaining compliance. Second, the model describes the message in relatively static terms of individuals' cognitions about message components: recognizing or appreciating an object of fear; perceiving it as painful, destructive, close at hand, contingent; feeling courage. Even the ideal outcome of the fear appealopening deliberations regarding an object of fear-involves inducing a state of mind or emotional disposition (Pfau 2007, 233) . Th ird, the model covers unilateral communication vectors only: speaker-to-message and messageto-addressee. A model that incorporates the message-to-speaker vector can account for "rhetorical intensifi cation" as relatively manipulative or not based not on whether the speaker believes addressees recognize or appreciate the object of fear but on openly undertaken, public commitments that using intense language makes manifest to addressees. In addition, an audience-to-message vector incorporates a judgment about whether the message is designed in a way that constrains addressees from openly dismissing the appeal as manipulative; such a judgment does not depend on an audience's state of mind but on message design features. logical model A second normative model of fear appeals may be described as logical. I focus on Douglas Walton's model because it is representative of a logical approach and is the most comprehensive treatment of fear appeals in argumentation theory research (see also Pinto 2004, 261, 269 and advises critics to not "condemn all ad baculum arguments on the grounds that they are irrelevant in a critical discussion or informed deliberation of political issues" (2000, 199) . Although the logical model is designed to represent "the cognitive component in how [fear appeal arguments] work to persuade" (2000, 23) , Walton describes the model in dynamic terms: "Th e structure is of such a kind that there has to be a sender and a receiver of the argument" (2000, 131) . For example, he observes that "if the respondents get any sense that the probability of the threatening outcome is being exaggerated, they will use that as an avenue to escape from the pressure of the argument" (2000, 193; see also 1996, 312) . Walton amplifi es:
By putting the argument in the form of a practical inference, the speaker tightens a kind of logical net around the hearer. . . . Th e question then posed is how the hearer can wriggle out of this net by challenging the premises, or fi nding some weakness in the linkage whereby the premises force the conclusion drawn in the argument. Th e hearer needs to respond to this logical argument by examining, or critically questioning its strong or weak points as a practical inference. Th e speaker and hearer can be seen as engaging in a kind of logical dialogue with each other. Th is theory represents a logical model of how the two parties are reasoning with each other in an orderly and structured way that represents a kind of practical rationality. (2000, 131) Th e model prescribes "how each agent should reason . . . [and] react" (2000, 132) . It also treats the emotion of fear as a source of the force of the appeal; "the key mechanism is that the situation cited is supposed to be so fearful that it overcomes the inertia of the respondent in taking an action that requires a certain eff ort or cost on his part" (2000, 144) .
Th is model is designed to help critics assess logical cogency and does just that and more as it begins to capture the interactive nature of rhetorical transactions. But in focusing on logical cogency only, it elides other message design features. As a result, it omits features that may comprise fear appeals, such as using intense language, and it explains the persuasive force of fear appeals-why addressees may be reasonably pressured to act as the speaker advocates-in terms of logical cogency only. Logical cogency ought to generate persuasive force, and it is possible for a speaker to design a fear appeal in just the form of the underlying practical inference structure. But, based on the Virginia ratifying convention debates and civic deliberations generally, that presentational design is atypical. A normative pragmatic model of fear appeals accounts for the actual presentational design-which includes but is not limited to manifestations of logical cogency-and in doing so explains why a message design feature like using intense language can be reasonably expected to generate persuasive force (Manolescu 2005, 144-45; Jacobs 2000, 263) . normative pragmatic model of fear appeals Th e characteristic design features of fear appeals-the claim that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as the speaker advocates, the presenting of grounds, and the use of intense language-make manifest public commitments, commitments that, in turn, alter the context such that speakers and addressees are enabled and constrained in what they may subsequently say. I explain how each message design feature may reasonably pressure addressees to act as the speaker advocates. Th e explanation comprises practical reasoning on both sides of the transaction-speaker and addressee-and bilateral communication vectors that account for why speakers may reasonably expect strategies to pressure addressees to act. Underlying normative pragmatic models is a philosophy of language that involves describing theoretical models in terms of practical reasoning. Th ese models do not purport that speakers in fact are reasoning in just the way described by the model (e.g., Kauff eld 2001). Likewise, the normative pragmatic model of fear appeals proposed here aims to account for message design features rather than make claims about what thoughts are consciously in a speaker's or addressee's mind (see also Goodwin 2001, 38-39; Kauff eld 2009, 240n2) . Th e normative pragmatic model of fear appeals is based on what rhetors say about their own and others' fear appeals.
At the core of a fear appeal is claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as the speaker advocates. For example, opponents of ratifi cation make statements such as "If a wrong step be now made, the republic may be lost forever" and "If you attempt to force it [the proposed Constitution] down men's throats, and call it union, dreadful consequences must follow" (Elliot 1891, 22, 159; see also 44, 46, 50-51, 57, 149, 151, 378, 452, 527, 591) . Proponents make statements such as "Our state vessel has sprung a leak; we must embark in a new bottom, or sink into perdition" and "If, in this situation, we reject the Constitution, the Union will be dissolved, the dogs of war will break loose, and anarchy and discord will complete the ruin of this country" (Elliot 1891, 106, 603; see also 37, 66, 70, 74, 90, 116, 132, 189, 329) .
Why would a delegate claim that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as he advocates? Why not simply cast a vote? By remaining silent, a delegate risks criticism for failing to warn about potential harms and, in doing so, failing to fulfi ll his duties as an elected representative. As we have seen, delegates provide just these kinds of reasons for why they make fear appeals. To avoid these kinds of criticism, a delegate may state potential harmful consequences of not acting as he advocates.
But claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as he advocates risks criticism on the grounds of poor judgment or fearmongering. Th e following disclaimers point to delegates' awareness of these risks: "I do not wish to frighten the members into a concession of this power, but to bring to their minds those considerations which demonstrate its necessity" and "Th is is not calculated to rouse the fears of the people. It is founded in truth" (Elliot 1891, 249, 313) . It is just these kinds of risks openly undertaken by a speaker that generate persuasive force for addressees to act as the speaker advocates. Disclaimers of this kind make manifest that the speaker knowingly undertakes risks and considers how addressees may publicly reason about his own reasoning, or, put diff erently, they make manifest what the message design enables addressees to say. Other things being equal, addressees may reason-may say-that the speaker would not risk criticism unless he had made a responsible eff ort to assess the circumstances; they see him risk criticism and see that he sees the risks, so the speaker's act of claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as he advocates creates a practical reason for addressees to do just that. Th is practical reason is a component of persuasive force-reasonable pressure to act.
Another component of persuasive force is the risks for addressees created by this same strategy of claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as the speaker advocates. Claiming that harmful consequences will occur constrains addressees' ability to say they did not think potential harms would result from not acting as the speaker advocates, because, other things being equal, saying so would put them at risk of criticism; it would be a fallible sign that they were not listening to the deliberations and, consequently, not making a well-informed decision. To avoid such a risk, they can act as he advocates. Of course it is also possible for them to avoid such a risk by making a case that harms are unlikely, for example, or that the speaker's recommended action is not the best way of avoiding them. Th e circumstances of the Virginia ratifying convention guaranteed that addressees would easily be able to avoid risks created just by claiming that harmful consequences would occur unless addressees act as the speaker advocates; delegates had time and the institution had procedures to challenge opposing arguments. For these reasons, as a speaker claims that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as he advocates in order to forestall criticism for failing to warn, so he continues to design the fear appeal in such a way as to forestall criticism with respect to other issues, such as whether grounds for fear exist at all and, if so, to what extent. Th us, one delegate emphatically states that until "they tell us the grounds of their fears, I will consider them as imaginary," and another states, "I shall not rest content with asserting-I shall endeavor to prove" (Elliot 1891, 48, 71) .
Given this analysis, it is predictable that another characteristic feature of making fear appeals with persuasive force is presenting grounds. In the Virginia ratifying convention debates, for example, delegates make statements such as "When we take a more accurate view of the principles of the Senate, we shall have grounds to fear that the interest of our state may be totally neglected," "I have every reason for determining within myself that our rejection must dissolve the Union; and that that dissolution will destroy our political happiness," "Contemplate our situation deliberately, and consult history; it will inform you that people in our circumstances have ever been attacked, and successfully: open any page, and you will there fi nd our danger truly depicted," "Th is altercation terminated in the dissolution of their union. From this brief account of a system perfectly resembling our present one, we may easily divine the inevitable consequences of a longer adherence to the latter," and "If this Constitution were safer, I should not be afraid. But its defects warrant my suspicions and fears" (Elliot, 1891, 221, 68, 74 [see also 7] ; 133, 641).
How does presenting grounds for fear generate persuasive force? Why may speakers expect this strategy to reasonably pressure addressees to act as they advocate? As is the case in stating potential harmful consequences, presenting grounds leaves a speaker open to the charge of poor judgment or fearmongering. Speakers make manifest that they knowingly undertake these risks when they say, for example, "that I may not be charged with urging suppositions, let us see what ground this stands upon, and whether there be any real danger to be apprehended," that "perhaps the same horrors may hang over my mind again. I shall be told I am continually afraid: but, sir, I have strong cause of apprehension," that "my fears are not the force of imagination; they are but too well founded," that "I hope that my fears are groundless," and that "many horrors present themselves to my mind. Th ey may be imaginary, but it appears to my mind to be the most abominable system that could be imagined" (Elliot 1891, 12, 47, 141, 282, 327) . Again, it is just the risk of these kinds of criticism manifestly undertaken by a speaker when he presents grounds that generates persuasive force for addressees to act as the speaker advocates. Making manifest that he knowingly accepts risks of criticism for poor judgment and fearmongering when he presents grounds again shows that he considers how addressees may publicly reason about his own reasoning, that he considers what they may say about his appeal. Th e appeal is designed in a way that enables addressees to say that the speaker would not risk the criticism that the act of presenting grounds makes him vulnerable to unless he had made a responsible eff ort to collect and assess grounds for fear. Th us presenting grounds creates a practical reason-in addition to the grounds themselves-for addressees to act as the speaker advocates. Th is practical reason is a component of the persuasive force generated by the strategy of presenting grounds.
Another component of the persuasive force generated by this strategy is the risks created for addressees, which can be seen in the case of the Virginia ratifying debates. Presenting grounds constrains delegates' ability to say they do not see grounds for fear. Th is ability is further constrained as delegates make manifest what they "see" and have "examined," and as they say that opponents cannot fail to see grounds they have presented (e.g., Elliot 1891, 187, 191, 243, 303, 354, 396, 436, 470, 473-74) . Other things being equal, delegates saying they do not see grounds for fear would be a fallible sign that they have not been paying attention to the deliberations or that they do not recognize good grounds-both of which could make them vulnerable to criticism for shirking or failing in their duties as representatives. To evade this risk, they can act as the speaker advocates or they can engage in argument, making a case, for example, that the grounds do not exist or are not as dangerous as the speaker suggests. Since the circumstances of the Virginia ratifying convention debates made these kinds of evasive maneuvers likely, a speaker would want to constrain addressees' ability to make them. Th e stronger the presentation of grounds, the more diffi cult it is for addressees to say that grounds for fears are weak without risking criticism and therefore the more persuasive force the fear appeal has-that is, the more the fear appeal constrains addressees to either act as the speaker advocates or manifest the comparable rationality of their position or, put diff erently, to deliberate well.
A third characteristic feature of fear appeals is intensity. Speakers may design fear appeals of varying intensity by attending to word choice, syntax, and broader units of composition. In the Virginia ratifying convention debates, Patrick Henry makes the most intense fear appeals in terms of quantity and quality. He claims, for example, that proponents of the proposed U.S. Constitution are trying to force the document "down men's throats," that there is nothing in the constitution to prevent the federal sheriff "from sucking your blood," that the state sheriff s are "unfeeling bloodsuckers" who have "committed the most horrid and barbarous ravages on our people," that "we shall have a king; the army will salute him monarch; your militia will leave you, and assist in making him king, and fi ght against you; want what have you to oppose this force? What will then become of you and your rights? Will not absolute despotism ensue?" and "I see the awful immensity of the dangers with which it is pregnant. I see it. I feel it. I see beings of a higher order anxious concerning our decision" (Elliot 1891, 159, 57-58, 59-60, 625 ; see also 448-49).
Levels of intensity may range from low to high. At issue is what level of intensity is appropriate. Certainly speakers are vulnerable to criticism for designing fear appeals that are short or long on intensity, and these assessments are based on all elements in rhetorical transactions, including the point in a speech or broader public controversy at which the fear appeal is made, the audience, the subject matter, and the occasion (Manolescu 2006, 337; Jacobs 2000, 263) . In the Virginia ratifying convention debates, delegates target Henry's intense fear appeals on the grounds that he has "entertained," "frightened," and "exclaimed, with uncommon vehemence" but that his argument appears "inconclusive and inaccurate." Th ey admire "his declamatory talents," but they "trust that neither declamation nor elegance of periods will mislead the judgment of any member here, and that nothing but the force of reasoning will operate conviction." He has "discarded, in a great measure, solid argument and strong reasoning, and has established a new system of throwing those bolts which he has so peculiar a dexterity at discharging," and his "rhetoric" has "highly colored the dangers of giving the general government an indefi nite power of providing for the general welfare" (Elliot 1891, 98, 101, 104, 177 [see also 383] , 466). Certainly using intense language makes speakers vulnerable to criticism that they are manipulating rather than arguing. Even Henry charges opponents with presenting "dangers of a very uncommon nature. I am not acquainted with the arts of painting. Some gentlemen have a peculiar talent for them. Th ey are practised with great ingenuity on this occasion" and asserts that "it is the fortune of a free people not to be intimidated by imaginary dangers. Fear is the passion of slaves" (Elliot 1891, 153-54, 140) .
Perhaps intensity more than other design features carries risks of criticism for fearmongering. Th is might explain why, with occasional exceptions, intensity is not a message design feature speakers at the Virginia ratifying convention typically employ in making fear appeals. But why Henry chooses to make highly intense fear appeals may be gleaned from the following disclaimer: "My sentiments may appear extravagant, but I can tell you that a number of my fellow-citizens have kindred sentiments, and I am anxious, if my country should come into the hands of tyranny, to exculpate myself from being in any degree the cause, and to exert my faculties to the utmost to extricate her" (Elliot 1891, 176 ; see also 56). He even goes so far as to assert that "conscious rectitude" both compels him to state his fears of the proposed Constitution even though these appeals have lead opponents to charge him with being a demagogue and, in these circumstances, consoles him (Elliot 1891, 45, 54) . He makes manifest that he knowingly accepts the risk of criticism and in doing so creates a practical reason for addressees to act as he advocates. Intensity changes the rhetorical context such that addressees may publicly reason that he would not risk criticism unless he had made a responsible eff ort to assess grounds for fear and to act in accordance with that judgment and with his duty as a representative. Th us intensity lends persuasive force to the fear appeal. But the risks incurred by using this strategy also help to explain why Henry interjects his own character into his rhetoric more than other delegates do.
3 Th e greater the intensity of the fear appeal, the more vulnerable he is to the change of manipulation, and so the more reason to make manifest that he accepts accountability for the veracity and proportion of his fear appeals.
At the same time, intensity creates some risk for addressees. Other things being equal, intensity makes it more diffi cult for them to say, for example, that they did not see potential harms or the severity of the threat. To avoid this risk, they can act as the speaker advocates or argue. But since intensity creates a context in which addressees may charge a speaker with manipulating rather than reasoning-especially in cases such as the Virginia ratifying debates in which the norm of deliberating reasonably is made manifest-this design feature pressures addressees to manifest rationality; it pushes them to both display it themselves and to demand it of the speaker. And thus an apparently manipulative appeal may create conditions for better deliberation even if its persuasive force is weak.
conclusions Th e normative pragmatic model of fear appeals proposed here begins with characteristic design features of fear appeals and comprises complex, interlocking practical reasoning that explains why these message design features reasonably pressure addressees to act as the speaker advocates or, in other words, why they generate persuasive force. It incorporates basic elements of rhetorical transactions-speaker, speech, audience, and context-and bilateral communication vectors. It transcends the normativedescriptive divide as it accounts for why what is normative has persuasive force. It provides an account of how to generate good deliberation that does not depend on the good will of either speaker or addressees; it explains how even reluctant or adversarial addressees acting only in self-interest may be reasonably pressured to deliberate well. Th e analysis explains how speakers who make fear appeals deploy and maintain rhetorical norms. External factors such as the education of citizens in critical thinking and the existence of a free press that serves as a watchdog may help to cultivate rhetorical norms. Th e analysis further explains how rhetorical practices may also be self-regulating; it suggests that when the practitioners hold themselves and each other accountable for the veracity and proportion of their claims, they design fear appeals with more persuasive force. So fear appeals that feature accountability have an important place in republican forms of government.
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